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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium job search model in which employees incur commuting costs,
and residential relocation is costly. We demonstrate that ﬁrms partially compensate
workers for the incurred relocation costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting
costs when house prices do not fully compensate the commuting costs. Taxing
reimbursement of relocation costs at a higher rate than reimbursement of commuting
costs raises the length of the average journey to work and this tax structure should
therefore be avoided if one of the governments’ policy objectives is to reduce the
(external) costs of commuting.
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1.0 Introduction
In the extensive literature on workers’ travel behaviour, it is common to
ignore ﬁrm decisions on travel behaviour (with the exception of parking
policies — see Shoup and Wilson, 1992; Shoup, 1994, and the location of
ﬁrms). As a result, within the transport economics literature, the theoretical
and empirical eﬀects of ﬁrm behaviour on workers’ transport decisions are
little known. As far as we are aware, hardly any attention has been given to
the implications of ﬁrms’ recruitment policies for travel behaviour.
In the current paper, we aim to explain the empirical observation that
many (private and public) ﬁrms reimburse residential relocation costs,
which encourages workers to move closer to the workplace (after accepting
the job oﬀer). Hence, the length of the commute is aﬀected by ﬁrms’ recruit-
ment behaviour.
Since the seminal work by Doeringer and Piore (1971), it is common to
divide the labour market into primary and secondary labour markets.
Primary labour markets refer to the higher segment of the market and
the secondary labour market to the lower segment. Typically, in the
primary market, employees are higher educated, more specialised, receive
higher wages, receive on-the-job training, have more job protection and
have more opportunities to move to better paid jobs. In the United King-
dom, 22 per cent of managerial/professional employees, who belong to the
primary labour market, receive a contribution to relocation expenses at the
moment of recruitment (RCI, 2001). Although we do not have such
detailed information for other countries, anecdotal evidence suggests
reimbursement of relocation expenses is common in primary labour
markets, but probably less so in secondary labour markets. It seems that
reimbursement is often institutionalised in collective bargaining agreements
in a number of European countries (for example, in the Netherlands, cover-
ing about 60 per cent of the employees).1
In the United Kingdom, reimbursement of relocation expenses tends to
be less common for ﬁrms located in London (see Van Ommeren et al.,
2006), suggesting that in large metropolitan areas, there is less rationale
to reimburse. Anecdotal evidence from the US is that reimbursement
only occurs when moving from one metropolitan area to another (that is,
when moving from a location from which commuting to the new job is
not feasible). In this situation, reimbursement has no, or limited, impact
1We have examined the presence of moving costs reimbursement for universities, since employment con-
ditions of universities are publicly available. Many universities publish their employment conditions on
internet. A straightforward internet search of the term ‘relocation expenses’ shows that in the UK,
Canada, USA and Australia, reimbursement of relocation expenses by universities is common.
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on the length of the journey to work. The observed diﬀerence in this respect
between the US and, for example, the Netherlands, will be discussed and
explained within the theoretical model.
This raises the questions of why ﬁrms reimburse residential relocation
costs, and why employees, particularly in the primary labour market,
receive such reimbursement. Does it depend on the spatial setting and the
functioning of the land/house market? Given answers to these questions,
we need to know what the consequences of taxes on reimbursement are
for commuting behaviour. These issues are relevant from a theoretical
and a policy point of view. From a labour economics perspective,
reimbursement of residential relocation costs is interesting, because
reimbursement cannot be explained in a fully competitive labour market.
The most common form of relocation costs reimbursement is that ﬁrms
oﬀer to reimburse (partially) the relocation costs only if the commuting
distance at the moment of application exceeds a certain value. The wage
level does not depend on whether the worker moves residence. Hence,
the total employment costs of workers who receive reimbursement of
relocation costs exceeds the employment costs of those workers who do
not move, which is inconsistent with the assumption of the perfect labour
market.
From a transport policy point of view, reimbursement is interesting,
because it shows how ﬁrm behaviour induces employees to reduce the
journey to work by moving residence. This is relevant because the journey
to work induces congestion and environmental externalities, whereas
moving residence does not. Further, reimbursement is relevant, because
reimbursement of residential relocation costs is in some countries treated
as taxable income when it exceeds a threshold2 (for example, in the Nether-
lands shipping costs plus 5,445 EUR or 12 per cent of annual income),
whereas reimbursement of commuting costs is not always taxed (for
example, company cars). Taxing reimbursement may be thought to increase
average commuting costs and therefore stimulate economic externalities
that are related to commuting such as congestion.
The current paper aims to address reimbursement of relocation costs by
developing a commuting model which explicitly takes labour market imper-
fections and wage bargaining between workers and employers into account.
The current study makes use of an equilibrium search model, also referred
to as a job matching model. Search behaviour of job seekers and employers
are both explicitly modelled and residential mobility, commuting costs,
2Presumably, such a threshold is imposed to avoid tax evasion (that is, ﬁrms pay wages by means of
reimbursements). Nevertheless, since we will demonstrate that ﬁrms reimburse residential relocation
costs for eﬃciency reasons, it will be ineﬃcient to impose such a low threshold.
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wages, number of unemployed and number of vacancies, are endogenously
determined. The emphasis of the paper is on an economy assuming homo-
geneous space. Such an assumption is particularly useful in the context of
polycentric urban areas, such as is prevalent in the Randstad in the Nether-
lands or the Ruhr area in Germany. This assumption will be contrasted
with the common (urban economics) assumption that employment is
concentrated in employment centres. This assumption is more useful in
the context of monocentric non-overlapping urban areas prevalent in the
USA, and particularly in Japan (Van Ommeren et al., 1999).
The outline of the current paper is as follows. In Section 2 we employ an
equilibrium job search model with homogeneous space, which includes
commuting, but excludes residential moving behaviour (see Van Ommeren
and Rietveld, 2005). In Section 3, we extend the model by including residen-
tial moving behaviour and relocation costs. Section 4 focuses on the tax
treatment of relocation costs reimbursement. Section 5 compares the
obtained results with a model that assumes that employment is concen-
trated in one business district. Section 6 concludes.
2.0 The Basic Job Matching Model
2.1 The job matching function
Wepresume a continuumof identical ﬁrms and residences, which are homo-
geneously distributed over a two-dimensional space. Given homogenous
space, there is no reason to expect diﬀerences in house prices over space,
therefore spatial variation in house prices is assumed to be absent.3 The
economy is closed. Each residence is inhabited by one individual, who is
either unemployed or employed. The unemployed search for jobs, the
employed do not search (for an equilibrium model which includes on-the-
job search, seeMortensen, 1994). The employed incurmonetary commuting
costs t. The unemployed search throughout geographical space, facing a
density of commuting costs g(t). The commuting costs become known at
the moment the unemployed job seeker and ﬁrm contact each other. A
ﬁrm consists of only one job, which is either ﬁlled or unﬁlled. In order to
ﬁll a job, ﬁrms post a vacancy. Firms and individuals are assumed to be
risk neutral.
Initially, we presume that workers do not move residence, because
residential relocation costs are inﬁnite. Suppose there are L identical
3In Section 5, we will make an alternative assumption. We will presume that employment is concen-
trated in one location, and we allow for house price variation.
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individuals in the labour force. We let u denote the unemployment rate and
v denote the vacancy rate, deﬁned as number of vacant jobs as a fraction of
the labour force L. We assume the existence of a matching technology that
gives the number of contacts between unemployed and ﬁrms as a function
of the number of unemployed uL looking for jobs and the number of ﬁrms
looking for workers vL. The number of contacts taking place per unit of
time is given by mL ¼ mðuL; vLÞ. The matching technology is assumed to
be increasing in both its arguments, concave, and having constant returns
to scale. Empirical studies generally accept the assumption of an aggregate
matching function with constant returns to scale (see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001)).
Given the matching technology, the probability for a vacancy to be
contacted per unit of time, denoted as q, is deﬁned. Given the constant
returns to scale assumption, it follows that:
q ¼ mðuL; vLÞ
vL
¼ m

u
v
; 1

¼ m

1
y
; 1

;
where y ¼ v=u. So, y is a measure of labour market tightness, deﬁned as the
ratio of the vacancy to the unemployment rate. Thus q, the rate at which
vacancies become contacted, depends negatively on the ratio of the vacancy
to the unemployment rate, y, and to emphasise this, we will denote the
vacancy contact rate as qðyÞ. Similarly, it can be seen that the rate at
which unemployed become contacted equals yqðyÞ, where yqðyÞ depends
positively on y.
2.2 Employed and unemployed
Each period an individual receives a wage w and incurs commuting costs t
when employed, and receives unemployment beneﬁts z when unemployed.
When employed, the commuting costs are exogenous to the worker. In
contrast, the wage is endogenous. Given the value of the commuting
costs t, ﬁrm and unemployed will bargain about the wage w, so w ¼ wðtÞ.
The worker will not keep the job forever. The job will be destroyed at
rate l and the worker will then become unemployed. The discount rate is
denoted as r.
We denote by U andWðtÞ the expected (discounted) lifetime income of
the unemployed and employed respectively. The lifetime income of the
employed can be written as:
rWðtÞ ¼ wðtÞ  tþ l½U WðtÞ: ð1Þ
The lifetime income of the employed is equal to the sum of the net wage —
the wage minus the commuting costs — and the expected change in lifetime
Reimbursement of Residential Relocation Costs Van Ommeren and Rietveld
55
income due to the probability of losing the job. We will show later on that
wðtÞ  t is decreasing in t. This implies that also WðtÞ is decreasing in t.
When ﬁrms and unemployed contact each other, the commuting costs
become known and they will form a match when WðtÞ > U. There exists
a maximum acceptable commuting cost T, called the reservation commut-
ing cost, at which the unemployed (and the ﬁrm) is indiﬀerent between
forming a match or continuing searching (for a proof see section 2.5). It
follows that only jobs incurring commuting costs less than T are accepted.
The fraction of acceptable jobs can be written as:Z T
0
gðtÞ dt ¼ GðTÞ; ð2Þ
where gðtÞ is the density of commuting costs which reﬂects the spatial density
of jobs. So, the unemployed become employed at rate GðTÞyqðyÞ. When
unemployed, the job seeker does not know the value of the commuting
costs, implying that the lifetime utility of the unemployed can be written as:
rU ¼ zþ GðTÞyqðyÞ½We U; ð3Þ
whereWe denotes the conditional expectation of the lifetime income when
employed, soWe ¼ EðW jt4TÞ. Interpretation of this Bellman equation is
as follows: the unemployed receives beneﬁts z and has per unit of time a
probability GðTÞyqðyÞ of becoming employed, and expects to receive an
increase in lifetime income equal to We U.
2.3 Job creation
The value of a vacancy, V, can be written as:
rV ¼ pcþ GðTÞqðyÞ½Je  V; ð4Þ
where pc denotes the ﬁrm’s hiring costs, which are presumed to be propor-
tional to productivity. Vacancies are ﬁlled at rate GðTÞqðyÞ and Je denotes
the conditional expectation of the job’s net worth. The value of an occupied
job is equal to the productivity level, denoted as p, minus the wage, wðtÞ,
taking into account that with probability l the job will be destroyed.
Hence, the value of the ﬁlled job can be written as:
rJðtÞ ¼ p wðtÞ  l½V  JðtÞ, or, similarly, JðtÞ ¼ p wðtÞ  lV
rþ l : ð5Þ
In equilibrium, all proﬁt opportunities from new jobs are assumed to be
exploited, driving rents from vacant jobs to zero, so V ¼ 0. This equili-
brium condition determines the supply of vacancies, implying that:
½rþ lJe ¼ p we ¼ ½rþ lpc
GðTÞqðyÞ ; ð6Þ
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where we denotes the conditional expectation of the wage. Equation (6)
states that the expected net return of the job, p we, is equal to the expected
capitalised value of the ﬁrm’s hiring cost. This condition is usually referred
to as the job creation condition (Pissarides, 2000).
2.4 Wage determination
Recall that the commuting costs become known at the moment the
unemployed job seeker and ﬁrm contact each other. The commuting
costs are a drawing from a known distribution. Given the commuting
costs, the unemployed and the ﬁrm bargain about the wage level, and
may then accept or reject the match. Following Pissarides (2000), we pre-
sume that the wage contract is renegotiable at all times. In equilibrium,
job matches yield a local-monopoly surplus. We assume that the total
surplus, equal to the sum of the workers’ surplus, WðtÞ U, and the
ﬁrms’ surplus, JðtÞ  V, is shared according to the Nash solution to a
bargaining problem, employing the following rule:
wðtÞ ¼ argmax½WðtÞ Ub½JðtÞ  V 1b; ð7Þ
where b is a measure of the workers’ labour strength, other than the ‘threat
points’ U and V. It can also be interpreted as the workers’ share of the total
surplus. We presume that 0 < b < 1. The ﬁrst-order equation satisﬁes:
WðtÞ U ¼ b
1 b ½JðtÞ  V : ð8Þ
This equation implies that ﬁrms and workers agree on which job matches to
accept, and which to reject. In equilibrium, V ¼ 0, so when J is less than 0,
W U is also less than 0, therefore ﬁrms and job seekers agree not to form
a match. In contrast, when J exceeds 0,W U exceeds 0, so ﬁrms and job
seekers both agree to form a match. When J ¼ 0, and therefore
W U ¼ 0, ﬁrm and job seeker are both indiﬀerent to forming a match
or continuing searching.
The wage can then be written as (see Appendix 1):
wðtÞ ¼ ½1 b½zþ t þ bpþ bpcy; t4T : ð9Þ
Equation (9) shows that the wage depends positively on commuting costs t.
Interpretation of these eﬀects is as follows. Conditional on the commuting
costs, ﬁrms and job seekers bargain about the wage. The higher the
commuting costs, the smaller is the worker’s surplus from the match
(which is equal to WðtÞ U), so the worker will ask (and receive) a
higher wage to be compensated. This explains why ﬁrms compensate
commuting costs.
Reimbursement of Residential Relocation Costs Van Ommeren and Rietveld
57
The equation also shows that the wage is increasing in the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt level, the productivity level and the average hiring costs per
unemployed ( pcy is equal to the hiring costs times the number of
vacancies divided by the number of unemployed, and can be interpreted
as the average hiring costs per unemployed). Finally, note that the current
interpretation of equation (9) is partial, because y is an endogenous
variable.
2.5 Reservation commuting costs
Job seekers and ﬁrms form a match when the commuting costs are less
than the reservation commuting costs T. The existence of the reservation
commuting costs can be easily shown. The net wage, deﬁned as the wage
minus the commuting costs, is decreasing in the commuting costs, since
1 b < 1 (see (9)). This implies that lifetime income W is a decreasing
function of the commuting costs t (see (1)), which is a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of the reservation commuting costs T. The reservation
commuting costs T can be derived by imposing that WðTÞ U is
equal to 0, so J is equal to 0 (see (8)). The latter condition implies that
(see (5)):
p wðTÞ ¼ 0: ð10Þ
So, the ﬁrm pays a wage equal to the productivity level, when the incurred
commuting costs are equal to the reservation commuting costs. Using the
wage equation (see (9)), the reservation commuting costs can be written as:
T ¼ p z b
1 b pcy: ð11Þ
So, the reservation commuting costs are equal to the productivity level
minus the unemployment beneﬁts and a share of the average hiring costs
per unemployed.
2.6 Equilibrium
In the steady state, the rate of individuals who enter unemployment,
lð1 uÞ, must be equal to the rate who would leave unemployment,
uGðTÞyqðyÞ. So, the unemployment rate can be written as:
u ¼ l
lþ GðTÞyqðyÞ : ð12Þ
The expected wage, we, can be written as:
we ¼ ½1 b½zþ te þ bpþ bpcy; ð13Þ
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where te denotes the conditional expected commuting costs and
te ¼ Eðtjt4TÞ ¼
Z T
0
tgðtÞ dt
GðTÞ :
The equations (6) and (13) determine y. This can be demonstrated by
incorporating the expected wage equation (13) into the job creation
condition (6):
½1 b½ p z te  ½rþ lpc
GðTÞqðyÞ ¼ bpcy: ð14Þ
Equation (14) can be solved uniquely for y. By diﬀerentiating equation (14)
with respect to the reservation commuting costs, we ﬁnd that two eﬀects
that T has on it, through te and through GðTÞ, cancel each other out, so
the value of y can be shown to be independent of T, an envelope property
implied by the optimality of T.Given y, the reservation commuting costs T
are determined (see (11)), and given y and T, the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate u is determined (12). So, the full equilibrium has been deﬁned.
The comparative statics results can be found in Table 1. Proofs can be
provided along the lines of Pissarides (2000). For example, the overall
eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the expected wage can be demonstrated
using Figure 1. The wage curve is an increasing function of labour market
tightness, whereas the job creation curve implies a negative relationship
between the wage and labour market tightness. The job creation curve
does not depend on the unemployment beneﬁts (see (6)), whereas the
expected wage curve shifts up when the beneﬁts increase (see (13)). Conse-
quently, the overall eﬀect of higher beneﬁts is an increase in the expected
wage. The negative eﬀect on labour market tightness follows from the
same ﬁgure.
Table 1
Comparative statics of a job search model excluding residential mobility
T y u V G we te
b ?  þ ? ? þ ?
p þ þ  ? þ þ þ
z   þ ?  ? 
r ?  þ ? ? ? ?
l ?  þ ? ? ? ?
c ?  þ ? ? ? ?
Note: þ ¼ positive;  ¼ negative; ?¼ ambiguous.
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3.0 The Job Matching Model with Residential
Moving Behaviour
3.1 Reimbursement of moving costs
We extend the equilibrium job search model by introducing residential
moves and residential relocation costs, denoted as m. The worker will
then either reduce the commuting costs by moving residence at the
moment of recruitment, or will not move at all. We presume that the
worker can freely choose the new location of the residence. It is optimal
for the worker to choose a location as close as possible to the new work-
place, so when workers move residence commuting costs will be reduced
to zero. We will demonstrate that the decision to move residence depends
negatively on the residential relocation costs m and positively on the
commuting costs at the moment of recruitment. Workers are partially
compensated for the residential relocation costs. It will also be demon-
strated that employees move residence when the commuting costs at the
moment of application exceed a threshold, denoted as T . One of the con-
sequences is that a contact generates a job match, either not accompanied
by a residential move (when t4T ) or accompanied by a residential move
(when t > T ).
It can be seen that T , deﬁned as the minimum commuting costs that
trigger a residential move, must be smaller than the reservation commuting
costs T, which are deﬁned as the maximum commuting costs when residen-
tial moves are inhibited; that is, when residential relocation costs are
inﬁnite. The proof is as follows. Presume that T  > T , so job contacts
implying commuting costs between T  and T will be rejected, whereas
contacts implying commuting costs larger than T  will lead to a job
match. Such behaviour is clearly irrational, implying that T 4T .
We will use subscripts m and s to indicate the choice between moving or
staying. Given the opportunity to move residence the lifetime income of the
Figure 1
Expected wages and labour market tightness
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unemployed can be written as:
rU ¼ zþ yqðyÞ½Wm U mHðT Þ þ yqðyÞ½Wes U½1HðT Þ; ð15Þ
where Wm denotes the lifetime income when the newly employed worker
moves residence and Wes denotes the expected lifetime income when
the worker stays in the same residence, and where HðT Þ denotes the
probability of moving residence given a job contact. So, HðT Þ ¼
1 R T 0 gðtÞ dt. Let wm and ws denote the wage of movers and stayers
respectively. So,
rWm ¼ wm þ l½U Wm; ð16Þ
and
rWsðtÞ ¼ wsðtÞ  tþ l½U WsðtÞ; ð17Þ
and thus
rWes ¼ wes þ l½U Wes ; ð18Þ
where wes denotes the expected wage of stayers, and where the expectation is
taken with respect to the (a priori unknown) commuting costs.
The newly recruited worker will move residence whenWm m5WsðtÞ.
The value of T  is determined by the conditionWm m ¼ WsðT Þ. Using
equations (16) and (17), this condition implies that:
wm  wsðT Þ ¼ ½lþ rm T : ð19Þ
Consequently, when the employee is indiﬀerent between moving or staying,
the wage ‘premium’ received by movers equals the capitalised relocation
costs minus the commuting costs. Suppose again that given a job contact,
the unemployed and ﬁrm bargain about the wage following the Nash
solution to a bargaining problem, so similar to (7), it follows that
wsðtÞ ¼ argmax½WsðtÞ Ub½JsðtÞ  V 1b;
and also that
wm ¼ argmax½Wm U mb½JmðtÞ  V 1b:
It can be shown that (see Appendix 2):
wm ¼ ½1 bzþ ½1 b½rþ lmþ bpþ bpcy; t5T  ð20Þ
wsðtÞ ¼ ½1 b½zþ t þ bpþ bpcy; t4T : ð21Þ
Equation (20) indicates that the wage of movers does not depend on the
commuting costs t at the moment of the job contact. It indicates that the
ﬁrm will partially reimburse the relocation costs, and reimbursement is
equal to ½1 b½rþ lm, where ½rþ lm denotes the capitalised relocation
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costs. Hence, ﬁrms partially compensate workers for the incurred relocation
costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting costs.
One interpretation of (20) seems to be that workers pay for the reloca-
tion costsm upfront, and are compensated by means of a higher wage equal
to a share ½1 b of the capitalised relocation costs, ½rþ lm. So, the wage
is the same each period until the worker is ﬁred. Recall that workers and
ﬁrms are risk neutral. An alternative interpretation to the wage bargaining
problem is thus that ﬁrms pay once ½1 bm to the relocated worker at the
moment of recruitment, and pay no compensation as part of the wage in
later periods. Which of the interpretations is correct? It appears that the
ﬁrst interpretation is not correct, because the employed individual’s
bargaining position after the ﬁrst period of employment is weakened
because after the move the commuting costs are zero (this can be easily
seen as wm > wsð0Þ, so Wm > Wsð0Þ). The moving costs are eﬀectively
sunk and do not play any further role in the bargaining process. The
model implies that relocation compensation is paid once upfront, because
the worker realises that after accepting the job and moving residence, the
moving costs are sunk and the wage will be reduced to the level consistent
with zero commuting costs. The interpretation of (21) is identical to the
interpretation of (9). We can summarise the above as follows:
Proposition 1 In a labour market with homogeneous space, search imperfec-
tions, commuting and bargaining, ﬁrms will partially reimburse workers
upfront for their moving costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting
costs.
We argue that the assumption of negotiable contracts induces upfront
reimbursement of moving costs. In the case of non-negotiable contracts
however, ﬁrms may also choose to pay each period ½1 b½rþ lm, so
workers bear all the risk. We will focus here on two possible extensions,
which are beyond the remit of this paper. One possible extension of the
model is then to assume that ﬁrms are risk neutral, whereas workers are
risk averse (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This assumption also implies
that larger ﬁrms compensate relocation costs upfront, whereas smaller
ﬁrms do not. Another possible extension is to allow for search on the job
(Pissarides, 2000). In this case, one expects that ﬁrms are not willing to
bear all the risk, due to adverse behavioural eﬀects of workers, so ﬁrms
may demand that the reimbursement is returned if the worker leaves
within a certain period.
Equations (20) and (21) imply that wm  wsðT Þ ¼
½1 b½lþ rm ½1 bT . Combining this result with equation (19)
implies that wm  wsðT Þ ¼ 0. It follows, using equation (19), that T 
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can be written as:
T  ¼ ½lþ rm: ð22Þ
It appears that T  has a straightforward interpretation which we state as
follows:
Proposition 2 In a labour market with homogeneous space, search imperfec-
tions, commuting and bargaining, the minimum commuting costs that trigger
a residential move are equal to the expected capitalised relocation costs.
This proposition implies that the minimum commuting costs that trigger a
move T  are an increasing function of l, r and m.4 Equation (22) has a
number of interesting implications: First, T  ¼ 0 if m ¼ 0. Hence, the
commuting costs are zero when moving costs are absent, showing that
given homogeneous space, non-zero commuting costs are the result of
the combination of the presence of residential moving costs and frictions
in the labour market, since job oﬀers come from a spatial distribution.
Second, to the extent that the discount rate is positively related to the
real interest rate, it appears a lower real interest rate induces workers to
commute less and to move residence more frequently. Third, in labour
markets where jobs are more often destroyed (l is high), so job turnover
is high, T  will be higher and moving residence closer to the job will
occur less often. Fourth, HðT Þ depends negatively on gðtÞ (which can be
easily seen since T  does not depend on gðtÞ). Hence, in labour markets
where the spatial density of jobs is high, moving residence to reduce the
commuting costs occurs less often.
One implication of Proposition 1 is that reimbursement of relocation
costs is less than the full costs of moving residence. For example, given
b ¼ 0:5 (which is a common assumption in the literature), reimbursement
is about half of the full relocation costs. Interestingly, the model suggests
that if labour markets are more competitive (so b is higher and workers
are paid (close to) the marginal productivity level), compensation for
moving costs is less. This probably contributes to the explanation of why
reimbursement of moving costs is mainly documented for managerial and
professional employees employed in primary markets, and less for
manual employees.
Proposition 2 implies also that employees in primary labour markets
(the higher segment of the labour market) are more likely to receive
4This suggests that in countries where residential relocation costs are high and job turnover is high (in
the current model captured by l), commuting costs tend to be higher.
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reimbursement of moving costs. In secondary labour markets, l tends to be
large (workers have less job protection, so are more often ﬁred) and gðtÞ
tends to be large (the job density is higher, since jobs are more homoge-
neous). Thus, the expected capitalised relocation costs and therefore the
maximally acceptable commuting costs are higher, so in secondary markets
moving residence to reduce the commute will occur less often, because
moving residence is too risky (l is large) and the probability of ﬁnding a
job close to the residence is higher (gðtÞ is large). Summarising, in secondary
labour markets, reimbursement of moving costs is less common, because
these markets are more competitive, job turnover is higher and the density
of jobs is higher in these markets.
3.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium, presuming T  < T , is further characterised as follows.
The unemployment rate equilibrium and the job creation condition can
be derived in the same way as in the previous section, the only diﬀerence
being that GðTÞ ¼ 1, because all job oﬀers are accepted. Hence,
u ¼ l
lþ yqðyÞ ; ð23Þ
and
p we ¼ ½rþ lpc
qðyÞ ; ð24Þ
where as before the net return of the job is equal to the expected capitalised
value of the ﬁrm’s hiring costs. It follows still that the expected wage is a
negative function of labour market tightness y, so ﬁrms will open less
vacancies if the expected wage is higher. The expected wage equation is
now equal to the weighted average of the wage received by movers, wm,
and the expected wage of stayers, wes , where the weights are determined
by the probability of moving residence HðT Þ. Hence:
we ¼ HðT Þ:wm þ ½1HðT Þwes : ð25Þ
Using (21), the expected wage of stayers, wes , can be written as:
wes ¼ ½1 b½zþ tes  þ bpþ bpcy: ð26Þ
Here, tes denotes the expected commuting costs of stayers, and is deﬁned as
follows:
tes ¼ Eðtjt4T Þ ¼
Z T 
0
tgðtÞdt
1HðT Þ : ð27Þ
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Given (25), the expected wage can be written as:
we ¼ ½1 bzþ bpþ bpcyþHðT Þ½1 b½rþ lmþ ½1HðT Þ½1 btes
¼ ½1 b

zþ
Z T 
0
tgðtÞdt

þ bpþ bpcyþHðT Þ½1 b½rþ lm; ð28Þ
where T  ¼ ½lþ rm. So, it follows from (28) that the expected wage we is
an increasing function of y (see Figure 1) and both are uniquely determined.
The equilibrium values of T , HðT Þ and tes are easily determined and
do not need more explanation. Equilibrium is therefore essentially a
triple (u; y;we) that satisﬁes the ﬂow equilibrium condition (23), the job
creation condition (24), and the expected wage condition (28). Equations
(24) and (28) determine the expected wage we and y, the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment; given the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, equation
(23) determines unemployment.
3.3 Comparative statics
To analyse the eﬀect of changes in the residential relocation costs, we note
that an increase in residential relocation costs increases the expected wage
we (see (28)) but does not aﬀect the job creation condition directly (24). So,
in equilibrium, an increase in residential relocation costs decreases labour
market tightness (see Figure 1), and increases the unemployment rate (see
(23)). This prediction is in line with the observation that in European
countries, compared to the United States, high levels of structural unem-
ployment go together with low residential mobility rates.
T  exists only when T  < T . The condition T  < T implies that
½rþ lm < p z b
1 b pcy;
see equations (22) and (11). If this condition is not fulﬁlled, irrespective of
the commuting costs, workers will not move residence, because the
capitalised residential relocation costs exceed the increase in lifetime utility
of becoming employed (so WðtÞ U m < 0). Hence, when relocation
costs are ‘too high’, ﬁrms will not compensate relocation costs, and job
seekers and ﬁrms will not form a match when commuting costs exceed T
(see Section 2).
The full comparative statics results can be found in Table 2. The eﬀects
of the model including residential mobility (Table 2) are, in many cases,
more precise than the model excluding residential mobility (Table 1). For
example, including residential mobility, an increase in the productivity
level unambiguously increases the number of vacancies, whereas excluding
residential mobility, the eﬀect is ambiguous (see Pissarides, 2000, p. 163 and
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p. 222, for similar results when introducing stochastic job matching). The
most interesting ﬁnding is that the eﬀects of the structural parameters on
the expected commuting costs are diﬀerent. Given the opportunity to
move residence (that is, relatively low relocation costs), the expected
commuting costs depend merely on three parameters (l, r, m) and do not
depend on labour market variables such as the productivity level. In
contrast, when workers do not have the opportunity to move residence
(that is, relatively high relocation costs), it is plausible that the productivity
level is one of the main determinants of the expected commuting costs (see
equation (11)). This ﬁnding suggests that the relationship between the
journey to work and productivity depends strongly on the residential
relocation costs.
4.0 Tax Treatment of Reimbursement of Relocation Costs
Until now, we have ignored the tax treatment of wages and compensation
for commuting and relocation costs.5 Let us suppose that all these
payments are taxed at the same marginal tax rate, Z. In this case, it can
be easily shown that the consequences for the labour market outcomes
(unemployment, vacancies, and wage) are identical to the standard model,
which excludes commuting and moving as described in Pissarides (2000,
p. 307). Because the reimbursements of commuting and moving are taxed
at the same rate, the probability of moving residence is not aﬀected by the
tax.
Table 2
Comparative statics of a job search model including residential mobility
T  y u V H we te
b 0  þ  0 þ 0
p 0 þ  þ 0 þ 0
z 0  þ  0 þ 0
r þ  þ þ  ? þ
l þ   ?  ? þ
c 0  þ  0 ? 0
m þ  þ ?  þ þ
Note: þ ¼ positive;  ¼ negative; ?¼ ambiguous.
5Taxes on fringe beneﬁts tend to be less than taxes on wages, which gives an incentive to ﬁrms to com-
pensate workers by means of fringe beneﬁts (Lazear, 1998). Note that when once-only reimbursement
payments of relocation costs are not taxed, whereas wages are, then it is plausible that workers are
compensated upfront.
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Let us now focus on the case that Zm 6¼ Zc, where Zm, Zc denote the
marginal tax on reimbursement of moving and commuting costs
respectively. In this case, it can be shown that the probability of moving
residence can be written as: Prðt=½1 Zcf1 bg > T Þ, where T  ¼
ðlþ rÞm=ð1 Zm½1 bÞ. Clearly, if Zc > Zm then the tax system
encourages workers to move, if Zc < Zm then the opposite occurs.
In many countries, reimbursement of relocation costs is accepted as a
non-taxable fringe beneﬁt under speciﬁc circumstances (for example, the
worker must have moved residence closer to the workplace) up to a
certain threshold. In some countries the threshold is low. For example, in
the Netherlands, the average relocation costs (of owners) are about three
times as high as the threshold. As mentioned in Section 1, in the Nether-
lands the threshold is maximally 5,445 Euro. The average value of a
dwelling is close to 150,000 Euro, whereas monetary relocation costs due
to transaction taxes are at least 10 per cent of the value of the dwelling.
At the same time, in many countries, one of the most important ways
of commuting compensation for workers is by means of a company car.
Taxation of company cars depends predominantly on the value of the
car and not on the commuting distance, so commuting costs are
eﬀectively not taxed. Let us suppose therefore that Zc ¼ 0 and Zm > 0,
so only the moving costs are taxed. In this case, the once-only
relocation costs reimbursement paid by ﬁrms is equal to
½1 bm=ð1 Zm½1 bÞ > ½1 bm (see Appendix 3), so workers receive
½1 Zm½1 bm=ð1 Zm½1 bÞ < ½1 bm. Consequently, the tax
system increases the ﬁrms’ employment costs, whereas the employee’s
after-tax reimbursement falls, which explains why the average commute
increases. Further, presume that Zm ¼ 0:5 (which is relevant for the
Netherlands) and b ¼ 0:5 (which is a common assumption). In this
particular case, T  ¼ 4=3ðlþ rÞm, so the tax on reimbursement increases
the minimum commuting costs that trigger a residential move by about
33 per cent (given the assumption that T  is less than T, so moving is
also an option given the tax). The average commuting costs (including
the movers) are equal toZ T 
0
tgðtÞdtþHðT Þ:0 ¼
Z T 
0
tgðtÞ:
Given two-dimensional space, gðtÞ ¼ at, where a > 0. Hence, the
average commuting costs are equal to ða=3ÞT 3. So, in this model the
average commute approximately doubles due to the tax structure, which
is substantial (since ð4=3Þ3  2Þ. This implies that a relatively small increase
in T  may induce a large increase in the average commute. This occurs
because a residential move induces the highest commuting costs to
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become zero, and because space is two-dimensional, so a small increase in
T  has a disproportional eﬀect on the average commute.
5.0 Non-homogeneous Space and House Prices
We have assumed above that space is homogeneous. We have argued that
given this assumption it makes sense to assume that spatial variation in
house prices is absent. Hence, workers will not be compensated for their
commuting costs in the housing market. This assumption may be con-
trasted with another assumption common in urban economics literature,
which holds that in urban areas, employment is concentrated in one area
(the Central Business District), which is surrounded by a residential area.
Suppose now free residential mobility of workers. In this case, it is generally
true that workers who live further away from the employment centre are
fully compensated by lower house prices (Fujita, 1989).
Let us suppose now that we make exactly the same assumptions about
the labour market as in Section 2, where we derived the wage equation,
given the absence of residence mobility. Now instead we follow Wasmer
and Zenou (2002) and presume that employment is concentrated in one
employment centre and house prices are endogenously determined.
Furthermore, and this is also fundamentally diﬀerent, the residence loca-
tion is freely chosen by employed and unemployed workers (so moving
costs are zero). It can then be easily seen that the employed choose to
live closer to the employment centre than the unemployed (the employed
have a reason to be closer to the employment centre, whereas the unem-
ployed have not). Furthermore, it appears that:
w ¼ ½1 bzþ bpþ bpcyþ ½1 btd ; ð29Þ
where td is deﬁned as the commuting costs paid by the worker who lives the
furthest away from the employment centre ((29) is implied by Wasmer and
Zenou, 2002). Hence, in contrast to (9), the wage does not depend on the
commuting costs t (note that the wage depends on td , which measures the
size of the urban area, but not the location of a worker). This makes
sense as workers are fully compensated by lower house prices in the housing
market.
Recall that Proposition 1 claims that ﬁrms reimburse workers for their
moving costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting costs. When
house prices fully compensate for commuting costs, then commuting com-
pensation does not occur, however (see (29)). Hence, reimbursement of
relocation costs will not occur provided that the presence of moving costs
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does not aﬀect the spatial variation in house prices (this is a reasonable
assumption; see Fujita, 1989). We arrive at the conclusion that only if
house prices fully compensate, then Proposition 1 does not hold.6 This
may explain why in London, where the house price gradient is steeper,
reimbursement of location expenses is less common than the rest of the
UK (see Van Ommeren et al., 2006). The novelty of our approach, com-
pared to for example, Wasmer and Zenou (2002), is that we allow for
positive moving costs and do not allow for house price compensation.
Note further that Wasmer and Zenou (2006) allow for positive relocation
costs (and house price compensation), but assume in that context that
ﬁrm compensation for moving costs is absent, so they do not study the
determinants of relocation costs reimbursement.
Consider now a multiregional structure where in each region employ-
ment is concentrated in the centre. Then one may expect that reimbursement
of residential relocation costs does not occur when a worker moves closer to
the workplace within the same urban area, because a reduction in commuting
costs is fully compensated via increased house prices. However, reimburse-
ment is expected to occur when a worker moves interregionally (see Zax,
1994, for a more general view on the distinction between intraregional
and interregional mobility). Such a prediction is in line with anecdotal
evidence for the US.
Consequently, we conclude that reimbursement of location costs
depends strongly on the spatial setting. To be more precise, reimbursement
should be less common for moves within (large non-overlapping) metro-
politan areas than in other areas, because in these areas, the house price
gradient is rather steep. This conclusion turns out to be consistent with
empirical evidence for the UK (see Van Ommeren et al., 2006). Note that
in the US many moves are within large metropolitan areas, so reimburse-
ment of moving costs should be less common than, for example, in the
Netherlands in line with anecdotal evidence.
6.0 Conclusion
We set out to analyse the eﬀects of residential relocation costs on workers’
compensation, aiming to explain the observation that ﬁrms compensate
residential relocation costs particularly in primary labour markets (RCI,
6Note that there is a large theoretical and empirical literature that shows that full compensation by
house prices does not occur for a number of reasons, uncertainty about the location of future employ-
ment probably being one of the main reasons (Crane, 1996).
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2001), but less so for moves within large metropolitan areas (Van Ommeren
et al., 2006). Hence, spatial structure is essential to the understanding of
residential costs reimbursement. We argue that competitive labour markets
combined with reduced tax rates on reimbursement of moving costs relative
to wages may not fully explain this observation. We demonstrate that given
labour market imperfections ﬁrms partially compensate workers for the
incurred relocation costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting
costs when house prices do not fully compensate for the commuting
costs. Our model is consistent with the observation that ﬁrms pay the
compensation upfront. One of the major consequences is that an increase
in residential relocation costs increases average commuting costs (and the
equilibrium unemployment rate). Therefore we have shown that ﬁrm
recruitment behaviour inﬂuences commuting behaviour. In the case that
relocation costs are ‘too high’, ﬁrms do not compensate relocation costs,
and ﬁrms and unemployed workers agree not to form a match, implying
a higher equilibrium unemployment rate. Our model predicts further that
reimbursement of relocation costs occurs particularly in primary labour
markets, but less so in secondary markets.
Especially in countries where cities are (relatively) small and close to each
other, and house prices are unlikely to compensate for the commuting costs,
taxing reimbursement of relocation costs at a higher rate than reimbursement
of commuting costs will increase the length of the average journey to work.
The main policy implication is that this tax structure should therefore be
avoided if one of a government’s policy objectives is to reduce the (external)
costs of commuting. The journey to work causes congestion and environ-
mental externalities, whereas moving residence does not.
Another more general implication is that we show the importance of ﬁrm
behaviour for transport decisions of workers. Firms are expected to inﬂuence
these decisions via their parking and compensation/recruitment policies.
Firms may compensate workers for commuting by means of higher wages,
the use of company cars, or by paying relocation reimbursement costs. In
the current paper, we have focussed on the reimbursement of relocation
costs. We believe that the eﬀects of ﬁrm behaviour on commuting patterns
may be substantial. They have received little attention in theoretical and
applied empirical research and therefore require more attention.
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Appendix 1
Derivation of the wage (given the absence of residential mobility)
Equations (6) and (8) imply that:
We U ¼ b
1 b
pc
GðTÞqðyÞ ; ðA1Þ
whereas equations (3) and (A1) imply that:
rU ¼ zþ y b
1 b pc: ðA2Þ
Reimbursement of Residential Relocation Costs Van Ommeren and Rietveld
71
Hence, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
WðtÞ U ¼ wðtÞ  t rU
rþ l ¼
wðtÞ  t z y b
1 b pc
rþ l : ðA3Þ
Making use of equations (5), (8) and (A3) and noting that V ¼ 0 reveals
that:
wðtÞ  t z y b
1 b pc
rþ l ¼
b
1 b
p wðtÞ
rþ l : ðA4Þ
Reordering of the last part of the equation, gives wage equation (9).
Appendix 2
Derivation of the wage given residential mobility
For workers who do not move residence, note that JsðtÞ ¼ JðtÞ and
WsðtÞ ¼ WðtÞ, where JðtÞ andWðtÞ are deﬁned by (5) and (1). Thus, equa-
tion (21) follows in the same way as equation (9). For movers,Wm is deﬁned
in the main text by (16) and Jm ¼ ½ p wm=½rþ l. Note further that (15)
can be rewritten as:
rU ¼ zþ y b
1 b pc; ðB1Þ
because, in a similar way as the derivation of (A1), it is true that:
wm U m ¼
b
1 b
pc
HðT ÞqðyÞ ; ðB2Þ
and
wes U ¼
b
1 b
pc
1HðT ÞqðyÞ : ðB3Þ
In the same way as Appendix 1, it appears then that:
wsðtÞ  t z y
b
1 b pc
rþ l m ¼
b
1 b
p wsðtÞ
rþ l ; ðB4Þ
hence (20) follows.
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Appendix 3
Reimbursement including taxation
Let us focus on an optimally chosen once-only reimbursement, which we
will denote by t, which will be paid to a worker who moves. In this case,
we may set the commuting costs to zero (because these costs are equal to
zero after the move) and proceed by assuming that the wages (excluding
the reimbursements t) and the reimbursement t are optimally set (in essence
the ﬁrm has two instruments: the wage and the once-only reimbursement of
moving costs, which are optimally chosen). So,
t ¼ argmax½Wð0Þ U mþ ½1 Zmtb½Jð0Þ  V  t1b; ðC1Þ
where V ¼ 0. Because the wage (excluding the reimbursement) is optimally
set, the following condition holds for moving and non-moving workers:
Wð0Þ U ¼ b=½1 bJð0Þ. Hence, it follows that the optimally chosen
reimbursement t ¼ ½ð1 bÞ=1 Zmð1 bÞm.
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